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Abstract
In this paper we address duopolistic competition when the firms have to
assess the results of the interaction at different scenarios. Specifically we
consider the case in which the scenarios are identified with several states of
nature and, therefore, the firms face uncertainty on their results. The proba-
bility of occurrence of the scenarios is unknown by the firms and they make
their output decision before uncertainty is resolved. Within this framework,
we analyze competition between firms when these firms exhibit extreme and
neutral attitudes towards uncertainty with respect to the final profits. For
the variety of cases that can occur, we characterize the sets of equilibria, and
provide procedures to determine them. The analysis proposed can also be ap-
plied to study situations in a deterministic setting with simultaneous multiple
scenarios, and to the analysis of multiple criteria duopolistic competition.
Keywords: Game theory, multi-scenario games, Cournot duopoly, equilibria.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a model of duopolistic competition where firms face
different market demands at several possible scenarios or states of nature. Only
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one will be realized as the true state, and no information is available about the
probability distributions of the occurrence of these states. Specifically, we analyze
the extension of a Cournot duopoly (Cournot, 1838) in which two firms producing
homogeneous products have to deal with uncertain demand and may show different
attitudes towards uncertainty.
Approaches based on subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954) could primarily
be used to address the identification of equilibria in a multiple scenario context.
When firms seek to maximize their expected profits with subjective probabilities
distributions, equilibrium outcomes are strongly determined by the vectors of prob-
abilities. However, in the strategic situations studied in this paper, uncertainty on
the probability distributions and attitudes of the firms with respect to risk are rele-
vant issues which cannot be easily accommodated in the theory of expected utility.
Other analysis of duopoly games where firms act under uncertainty can be found
in the literature. One line of research investigates incentives for duopolists to share
their private information about market uncertainty with its competitors. For in-
stance, Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), Li (1985), Gal-Or (1986),
among others, analyzed how market uncertainty with either unknown market de-
mand or unknown constant marginal cost affects firm’s behavior. More recently,
Wu et al. (2008) address a Cournot model with capacity constraints, in which the
uncertainty is about uncertain demand conditions or production costs.
Related work on oligopolistic competition under uncertainty have focused on
the conditions for the existence of equilibria and their properties, in an effort to
provide a general and tractable framework for the analysis of quantity competition
under demand uncertainty. In this line of research, Eichberger and Kelsey (2002),
analyzed the effect of ambiguity in symmetric n-player games with aggregate exter-
nalities. The application of their results to a Cournot oligopoly showed that the
total output in these models is lower when there is uncertainty. Lagerlo¨f (2007)
obtains the conditions on distribution functions of the stochastic demand intercept
that guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium in a linear framework, while
Einy et al. (2010) show some examples in which a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium
in pure strategies may not exist when firms have incomplete information about
demand and costs. Moreover, they provide sufficient conditions for existence and
uniqueness of Cournot equilibria in a certain class of industries. De Frutos and
Fabra (2011) and Lepore (2012) consider two-stage games to analyze competition
between firms in which firms make capacity investments under demand uncertainty
prior to competing in prices.
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The majority of these papers have assumed that firms are risk neutral. Never-
theless, evidence shows that in the presence of uncertainty, firms often exhibit dif-
ferent risk attitudes. The incorporation of these rational, but uncertain, beliefs will
certainly influence the outcomes of the decision processes. This issue has been anal-
ysed by Asplund (2002), who studied competition in prices and quantities between
risk-averse firms. Fontini (2005) analyzed a Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty
using the Choquet expected utility model (Schmeilder, 1989) with optimistic and
pessimistic firms, and showed that when uncertainty is low, optimistic firms make
higher profits than pessimistic firms, and when uncertainty is high, only optimistic
firms participate in the market producing too much and facing losses. Eichberger et
al. (2009) also addressed ambiguity in strategic games. In their model, uncertainty
is defined over the other players’ actions. Formally, individuals partially distrust
their own beliefs about other players’ behavior and place themselves in the best and
worst cases depending on their relative optimism and pessimism. In a recent paper,
Chronopoulos et al. (2014) analyze the impact of risk aversion and uncertainty on
the optimal investment timing decision in a duopolistic competition. They consider
the case where the two competing firms exhibit the same level of risk aversion.
In the above mentioned papers, uncertainty is analysed by means of a random
variable in the corresponding parameter of the model or by considering a probability
distribution on the state of nature, and expected utility theory is applied then in
order to make decisions. By contrast, we develop our study in a context where
the probabilities of occurrence of these states cannot be ascertained by firms. Our
approach is essentially based on the idea that uncertainty cannot be modeled globally
for every action of one of the firms. Due to the strategic interdependence of the
environment in which firms make their decisions, a firm’s best strategy not only
depends on the strategy adopted by the other firm, but also on the performance of
the profits in the scenarios.
In our setting, the firms face a different market demand in each of the two
scenarios. The profits of the firms depend on the scenario that will occur, and the
firms’ attitudes to uncertainty are defined with respect to the profits in each possible
scenario. In our model firms have to make their output decision before uncertainty
is resolved, and, contrarily to the subjective expected utility approach, it is assumed
that no information exists on the probability of occurrence of the different states.
In order to describe the reaction functions of the firms in the multiple scenario
framework, we need to take into account the different attitudes towards uncertainty
that they may exhibit. In the situations we investigate, such attitudes are explained
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by the importance that each firm gives to the realization of profits: a firm is con-
servative if it gives relatively greater importance to the scenario with low profits,
the reverse is true for optimistic firms. More precisely, we investigate the situations
in which these attitudes represent the extreme cases, i.e., conservative firms which
only take into account the scenario that implies the lowest profit, and optimistic
firms which only consider the scenario with the highest profit. We also consider the
case of neutral firms which have a similar concern about both scenarios.
It is worth remarking that subjective expected utility approaches are limited to
the cases in which all the firms are expected profit maximizers. Our model gener-
alizes the representation of their preferences by allowing also the possibilities that
firms are minimum (maximum) profit maximizers. Our representation of conserva-
tive preferences can be considered a special case of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989)
maxmin expected utility model in which all the probability distributions are possi-
ble, whereas the neutral attitude of the firms is identified with the maximization of
expected utility when all the scenarios are equally probable.
In this paper we present an analysis of the different competitive situations that
can arise. That is, we study the cases in which both firms have the same attitude
to uncertainty, and the cases in which this attitude is different. In Caraballo et al.
(2015), we analyzed duopolistic competitions under uncertainty in which demand
functions are linear and the firms exhibit identical extreme attitudes towards un-
certainty. Now, we extend and complete the investigation of strategic competition
between firms in a multiple scenario framework.
The main contributions in this new paper are: Firstly, we extend the analysis to
strategic competition in which the firms deal with general demand functions. This
new context is more complex, since some of the desirable and well-known properties
of linear functions are lost. We investigate to what extent the results for linear
demands are also valid in the general case. Secondly, we address the cases in which
the firms do not show the same attitude towards uncertainty. The analysis of these
models becomes more complicated as a consequence of the lack of symmetry, and this
is the reason of the scarcity of results in the existing literature. However, our results
on duopoly models under uncertainty with asymmetric firms provides more accurate
insights into Cournot competition. Overall, we present an unified framework for the
exhaustive analysis of the different cases.
Our first result is the identification of the reaction functions for conservative,
optimistic, and neutral firms in terms of the reaction functions at each scenario. On
the basis of these reaction functions we characterize the equilibria for several specific
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situations: both firms are conservative, both firms are optimistic, both firms are
neutral, and the mixing between the three types of previous firms. We state that
for the cases in which firms show the same attitude to uncertainty, equilibria always
exist, and general procedures to determine them are provided. In the cases in which
the attitude to uncertainty of the firms does not coincide, the existence of equilibria
cannot always be assured. Nevertheless, we provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of equilibria, together with results that permit the identification of the set
of equilibria.
The methodological framework considered in this paper can also be applied to
other decisional contexts in which the utilities of the firms are represented by vector-
valued functions. These contexts include Cournot games in which the profits of the
firms are evaluated simultaneously in different scenarios. For instance, these scenar-
ios can be several geographical regions, or different types of consumers. Another kind
of problem in which the analysis proposed can be helpful is multi-criteria Cournot
games. In these models, firms regard several conflicting criteria at the same time.
For example, social responsible firms take into account not only their profits, but
also a share of consumer surplus, and this additional goal may heavily influence the
equilibrium outcomes. Related work about multi-criteria strategic models is Ma´rmol
et al. (2016) and Monroy et al. (2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
The reaction functions for conservative, optimistic and neutral firms are established
in Section 3. In Section 4 the notion of equilibrium with attitude to uncertainty is
stated. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the analysis of the equilibria when firms
have identical attitude to uncertainty and different attitude to uncertainty, respec-
tively. Section 7 contains the conclusions of this research. In order to simplify the
presentation, proofs are included in an Appendix.
2 Two-scenario Cournot games
We consider a duopoly situation in which two firms producing homogeneous com-
modities compete in quantities and face uncertain market demand since two different
future scenarios are possible. In scenario k, k = 1, 2, the inverse demand function
is given by p = Pk(Q), where Q is the total quantity produced in the market. As
it is standard in the literature (see for instance, Kreps and Scheinkman(1983)),
we assume that each function Pk(Q) is twice-continuously differentiable, strictly
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decreasing, concave and non-negative on some bounded interval (0, Qk), and that
Pk(Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Qk.
In order to avoid trivial cases, we assume that the profit function of one of the
scenarios does not dominate the other. For the sake of simplicity in the presentation,
we also assume that the demand functions only intersect once. Thus, we consider
that the reservation price in the first scenario, P1(0), is higher than that of the
second, P2(0), and the perfect competition quantity at scenario 1 is smaller than
the perfect competition quantity at scenario 2. By dropping this assumption, we
could face a situation in which the demand functions intersect twice. An extended
analysis based on the same ideas as those presented here could be performed for
these cases.
Firms i = 1, 2 are allowed to select any non-negative quantity qi. Since the
demand is bounded, the strategy set of each firm is given by a bounded convex set
Ai ⊆ [0,∞), i = 1, 2.
For simplicity, it is assumed that firms have no fixed costs and their marginal
costs are equal to zero. In addition, we consider that the reservation price and
market size are finite. Thus, for i = 1, 2, the profit for firm i at scenario k is:
Πik(q
1, q2) = qiPk(q
1 + q2), and the two-scenario Cournot game is represented as
G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}.
Note that in each scenario, the profit function of each firm is strictly concave
in its own action. As a consequence, given the action of one of the firms in the
corresponding interval (0, Qk), the profit of the other attains its maximum where
its derivative is null. For qj ∈ (0, Qk), the reaction function of firm i to the action
of firm j at scenario k, denoted by rik(q
j), is implicitly defined by the following
equation.
Pk(q
1 + q2) + qiP ′k(q
1 + q2) = 0.
For qj ≥ Qk, the reaction function is defined as rik(qj) = 0. Under our initial
assumptions on the inverse demand functions, the reaction functions at each sce-
nario, rik, are non-increasing, strictly decreasing over the range where it is strictly
positive, and continuously differentiable (see, for instance, Kreps and Scheikman,
1983). Moreover, these assumptions guarantee the existence of a unique Cournot
equilibrium at each scenario.
In our analysis the different attitudes towards uncertainty are modeled by means
of a value function which represents the firm’s evaluation of the profits attained in
both scenarios when the different strategies are adopted. We will investigate the
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cases in which firms are conservative, optimistic and neutral. A conservative firm
follows the extreme maxmin utility decision rule that prescribes concentrating on
the state with the lower profit. An optimistic firm evaluates its profit assuming the
occurrence of the higher-profit state. A neutral firm considers the average between
both extreme evaluations.
The corresponding value functions for the different types of firms are respectively:
Πic(q
1, q2) = Min{Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)},
Πiop(q
1, q2) = Max{Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)},
Πin(q
1, q2) =
1
2
(Πic(q
1, q2) + Πiop(q
1, q2)).
3 Reaction functions with attitudes to uncertainty
Under our initial assumptions on the demand functions, for positive values of P and
Q, the inverse demand functions of the scenarios intersect at only one point. Denote
by Q¯ the point such that P1(Q¯) = P2(Q¯), and note that for values of Q below Q¯,
the price in scenario 2 is lower than the price in scenario 1.
Thus, if firm i is conservative, then the value function is:
Πic(q
1, q2) =
{
Πi2(q
1, q2) if q1 + q2 ≤ Q¯
Πi1(q
1, q2) if q1 + q2 ≥ Q¯ .
If firm i is optimistic, then the value function is:
Πiop(q
1, q2) =
{
Πi1(q
1, q2) if q1 + q2 ≤ Q¯
Πi2(q
1, q2) if q1 + q2 ≥ Q¯ .
If firm i is neutral, then the value function coincides with the average utility. Thus,
it can be written as:
Πin(q
1, q2) =
1
2
(Πi1(q
1, q2) + Πi2(q
1, q2)).
Both the value function of the conservative firm and the value function of the op-
timistic firm are continuous in the strategy space of the firms. However, note that
they are not differentiable at the points in which q1 + q2 = Q¯.
Denote by L the line representing a total quantity equal to Q¯ ,
L = {(q1, q2) ∈ IR2 | q1 + q2 = Q¯}.
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This line plays a central role in the analysis presented in this paper, since it partitions
the space of strategies of the firms into two regions, L, L¯, in which the profit function
of one or the other scenario applies.
The relative position of this line and the curves representing the reaction function
of the firm at each scenario determines a piece-wise reaction function for the pes-
simistic firm, and also a piecewise reaction function for the optimistic firm. The
derivatives of the reaction functions in each scenario verify (rik)
′(qj) ≥ −1, for
k = 1, 2, i = 1, 2, with strict inequality for qj such that rik(q
j) > 0 (see Kreps
and Scheinkman, 1983, Lemma 1, p. 328). The slope of the line L is equal to −1.
As a consequence, the line intersects each one of the reaction functions at most at
one point.
In what follows, we assume that the inverse demand functions in the scenarios
are such that ri1(q
j) ≤ ri2(qj) for all qj ∈ Aj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. This assumption
is not very restrictive. In fact, it is adopted in the general treatment proposed by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), and it holds for a wide range of demand functions,
including linear and quadratic demand functions, among others.
The following result describes the reaction function of a conservative firm, de-
noted by Ric.
Lemma 3.1. If firm i is conservative, then the reaction function, Ric, is given by:
Ric(q
j) =

ri1(q
j) for Q¯− qj ≤ ri1(qj) ≤ ri2(qj)
Q¯− qj for ri1(qj) ≤ Q¯− qj ≤ ri2(qj)
ri2(q
j) for ri1(q
j) ≤ ri2(qj) ≤ Q¯− qj
That is to say, the reaction function for a conservative firm i is a piecewise
continuous function, which coincides with the reaction function corresponding to
scenario 1 for those strategies of firm j such that the total quantity offered when
firm i reacts with his best response at scenario 1 is greater than Q¯. It coincides with
the reaction function corresponding to scenario 2 for those strategies of firm j such
that the total quantity offered when firm i reacts with his best response at scenario
2 is below Q¯. Otherwise, the best response of firm i makes the total quantity offered
equal to Q¯. It is worth remarking that, since the reaction function at each scenario
intersects L at most at one point, then the piecewise conservative reaction function
is formed by at most three pieces.
Figure 1 is an illustration of the reaction function for a conservative firm.
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Figure 1: The reaction function of a conservative firm.
The reaction function for an optimistic firm i is denoted by Riop. The following
lemma establishes that if the total quantity offered with the pair of strategies ob-
tained with qj and the reaction of firm i at scenario 1 is above Q¯, then the reaction
of an optimistic firm coincides with the reaction function at scenario 2. Similarly,
if the total quantity offered with the pair of strategies obtained with qj and the
reaction of firm i at scenario 2 is below Q¯, then the reaction of an optimistic firm
coincides with the reaction function in scenario 1.
Lemma 3.2. If firm i is optimistic, then
a) If Q¯− qj ≤ ri1(qj) ≤ ri2(qj), then Riop(qj) = ri2(qj).
b) If Q¯− qj ≥ ri2(qj) ≥ ri1(qj), then Riop(qj) = ri1(qj).
The reaction of firm i for values of qj such that ri1(q
j) ≤ Q¯ − qj ≤ ri2(qj), still
remains to be established. For these values of qj, the best response of firm i is
either ri1(q
j) or ri2(q
j). If the best response in the first scenario, ri1(q
j), is chosen,
then under the first scenario the profit would be ri1(q
j)P1(r
i
1(q
j) + qj). If ri2(q
j) is
selected, then under the second scenario the profit would be ri2(q
j)P2(r
i
2(q
j) + qj).
An optimistic firm will select the best response that yields the highest profit.
The values of qj for which the profit obtained in scenario 1 with the best response
in scenario 1 coincides with the profit in scenario 2 with the best response in scenario
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2 are the values for which this firm switches from one of the best responses to the
other. These values are the solutions to the equation:
ri1(q
j)P1(r
i
1(q
j) + qj) = ri2(q
j)P2(r
i
2(q
j) + qj) (3.1)
That is, to say
Πi1(r
i
1(q
j), qj) = Πi2(r
i
2(q
j), qj).
Let S be the set of positive solutions of this equation, S = {st}t=1,...t¯, and set
s0 = 0, and st¯+1 = +∞.
Note that Πi1(r
i
1(q
j), qj), Πi2(r
i
2(q
j), qj) are continuous as functions of qj, and that
the solutions of this equation are the points at which the reaction function, Riop,
switches from the reaction function in one scenario to the reaction function in the
other scenario. Thus, these are the only points in which Riop can be discontinuous.
The description of the reaction function of an optimistic firm i, Riop, depends on
which of the best responses of the scenarios applies at qj = 0. In both scenarios,
the best response of firm i, when the strategy of firm j is qj = 0, is the monopoly
quantity qMk , and therefore, Π
i
k(r
i
k(0), 0) = Π
i
k(qMk , 0). If Π
i
1(qM1 , 0) > Π
i
2(qM2 , 0)
then Riop(0) = r
i
1(0). Analogously, if Π
i
1(qM1 , 0) < Π
i
2(qM2 , 0) then R
i
op(0) = r
i
2(0).
Note that Πik(qMk , 0) represents the monopoly profit at scenario k, which is the
maximum profit attainable under that specific scenario.
Thus, in order to describe the reaction function, we consider two cases, as estab-
lished in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. If firm i is optimistic, the following hold:
a) If Πi1(qM1 , 0) > Π
i
2(qM2 , 0), then
Riop(q
j) =
 r
i
1(q
j) if st ≤ qj < st+1, with an even t
ri2(q
j) if st ≤ qj < st+1, with an odd t.
b) If Πi1(qM1 , 0) < Π
i
2(qM2 , 0)
Riop(q
j) =
 r
i
1(q
j) if st ≤ qj < st+1, with an odd t
ri2(q
j) if st ≤ qj < st+1, with an even t.
Note that if Q¯ ≥ ri2(0) ≥ ri1(0), then it follows from Lemma 3.2 that Riop(0) =
ri1(0), and case a) of the lemma holds. If r
i
1(0) ≤ Q¯ ≤ ri2(0) then, either cases a) or
b) can occur.
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Figure 2: The reaction function of an optimistic firm.
Figure 2 illustrates the reaction function of an optimistic firm. Note that the
result does not guarantee the uniqueness of the solution of Equation 3.1 in each
interval.
For the case of a neutral firm, the value function is
Πin(q
1, q2) =
1
2
(Πi1(q
1, q2) + Πi2(q
1, q2)).
It follows from our initial assumptions that the value function for the neutral
firm is differentiable and strictly concave in its own action, and the corresponding
reaction function is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable. Moreover,
the reaction function of a neutral firm is always in the region bounded by the reaction
function in each scenario as stated formally in the next result.
Lemma 3.4. If firm i is neutral, then the reaction function, Rin, is non-increasing,
strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable in some bounded interval. More-
over, it verifies ri1(q
j) ≤ Rin(qj) ≤ ri2(qj) for all qj ∈ Aj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Figure 3 is an illustration of the reaction function of a neutral firm.
4 Equilibria with attitudes to uncertainty
In our analysis the different attitudes towards uncertainty are modeled by means
of a value function which represents the firm’s evaluation of the profits attained in
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Figure 3: The reaction function of a neutral firm.
both scenarios when the different strategies are adopted.
In general, for i = 1, 2, the attitude towards uncertainty of firm i is represented
by a function ui : IR2 → IR, fulfilling:
a) ui is non-decreasing in each of its arguments.
b) ui(y1, y2) > u
i(x1, x2) whenever y1 > x1 and y2 > x2.
For (q1, q2) ∈ A1 × A2, denote Πiui(q1, q2) = ui(Πi1(q1, q2),Πi2(q1, q2)).
The notion of Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) when firms exhibit different atti-
tudes to uncertainty can now be stated.
Definition 4.1. (q∗1, q∗2) is an equilibrium for the two-scenario Cournot game
G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2} in which the attitude towards uncertainty of the firms is
represented by u = (u1, u2), if for each q1 ∈ A1, q1 6= q∗1, Π1u1(q1, q∗2) ≤ Π1u1(q∗1, q∗2)
holds, and for each q2 ∈ A2, q2 6= q∗2, Π2u2(q∗1, q2) ≤ Π2u2(q∗1, q∗2) holds.
Denote by Eu(G) the set of these equilibria.
Equivalently, Eu(G) are the equilibria of the standard normal-form game Gu =
{(Ai,Πiui)i=1,2}.
Recall that it is assumed that the inverse demand functions at the scenarios are
such that ri1(q
j) ≤ ri2(qj) for all qj ∈ Aj, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Denote by T the following
region:
T = {(q1, q2) | r11(q2) ≤ q1 ≤ r12(q2), r21(q1) ≤ q2 ≤ r22(q1)}.
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Lemma 4.2. If, for i = 1, 2, the functions ui fulfills a) and b), then the set of
equilibria of the two-scenario Cournot game G with respect to u = (u1, u2), Eu(G),
is contained in T .
5 Equilibria for symmetric firms
In this section we analyse the case of symmetric firms, that is, two-scenario Cournot
games in which the firms exhibit identical attitude towards uncertainty.
5.1 Conservative equilibria
In order to model a duopoly in which both firms are conservative, the value function
of the firms is represented by the worst profit obtained in the scenarios. That is, for
i = 1, 2, ui ≡ c, with c(x1, x2) = Min{x1, x2}.
Therefore, a pair of strategies of the firms is a conservative equilibrium for the
two-scenario Cournot game, G, if it is an equilibrium when the attitude towards
uncertainty of both firms is represented by the function c. With conservative equi-
libria, the firms produce quantities such that no individual deviation produces an
improvement in the minimum profit. We denote by Ec(G) the set of conservative
equilibria of game G.
Equivalently, a conservative equilibrium for the two-scenario Cournot game G is
an equilibrium for the standard normal-form game, Gc = {(Ai,Πic)i=1,2}.
As a consequence of the concavity in its own action of the conservative value
function, the existence of conservative equilibria is assured under our assumptions.
However, since strict concavity fails, multiple equilibria may exist. The following
results identify these equilibria for the general case.
For k = 1, 2, denote by (c∗k, c
∗
k) the Cournot equilibrium in scenario k. The
existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium in each scenario is guaranteed
under the initial assumptions. Note that 2c∗1 ≤ Q¯ ≤ 2c∗2 if and only if T ∩ L 6= {∅}.
The following result identifies the conservative equilibria.
Theorem 5.1. The set of conservative equilibria for the two-scenario Cournot game
G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2} is given by
a) If Q¯ ≤ 2c∗1, then Ec(G) = {(c∗1, c∗1)}
b) If 2c∗1 < Q¯ < 2c
∗
2 then E
c(G) = T ∩ L
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c) If Q¯ ≥ 2c∗2, then Ec(G) = {(c∗2, c∗2)}
Note that if 2c∗1 ≤ Q¯ ≤ 2c∗2, then the points in T ∩ L are the conservative
equilibria. In the cases in which T ∩ L = {∅}, a single conservative equilibrium
exists which coincides with either the Cournot equilibrium in one or in the other
scenario.
5.2 Optimistic equilibria
The other extreme case in terms of uncertainty attitude of the firms is the situation
when the two firms select their strategies by only taking into account the best of the
results they can obtain. That is, for i = 1, 2, ui ≡ op, with op(x1, x2) = Max{x1, x2}.
A pair of strategies of the firms is an optimistic equilibrium for the two-scenario
Cournot game, G, if it is an equilibrium when the attitude towards uncertainty
of both firms is represented by the function op. We denote by Eop(G) the set of
optimistic equilibria of game G. Equivalently, an optimistic equilibrium for the
two-scenario Cournot game G is an equilibrium for the standard normal-form game,
Gop = {(Ai,Πiop)i=1,2}.
Accordingly, in an optimistic equilibrium firms obtain quantities such that no
individual deviation produces an improvement in its maximum profit.
When both firms are optimistic, since the reaction functions of the firms may
be discontinuous, the existence of equilibria cannot be assured. However, Roberts
and Sonnenschein (1976) showed the existence of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium
for n identical firms when the discontinuities of the reaction functions take the form
of ”upward jumps”, that is, if the function is continuous from the right and upper
semicontinuous from the left. As a consequence of this result, when only a switch
between scenarios occurs, the existence of equilibria is assured. This is the case of
linear demand functions as shown in Caraballo et al. (2015).
Conditions for the existence of the optimistic equilibria based on the relationship
between regions T and L can now be established.
Note that the optimistic reaction functions of the firms are formed by pieces
of the reaction functions at each scenario, therefore the candidates for optimistic
equilibria are the points where they intersect. It follows from the symmetry of the
model that these points are necessarily the Cournot equilibria at the two scenarios.
This fact is formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. If (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Eop(G) then (q¯1, q¯2) = (c∗1, c∗1) or (q¯1, q¯2) = (c∗2, c∗2).
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This result does not guarantee the existence, nor the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium.
It is also easy to see that when the Cournot equilibria of the two scenarios are
both located on the same region of those limited by L, then the optimistic equilibria
exists and coincides with one of them, as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.3. Let G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2} be a two-scenario Cournot game
a) If Q¯ < 2c∗1, then E
op(G) = {(c∗2, c∗2)}.
b) If Q¯ > 2c∗2, then E
op(G) = {(c∗1, c∗1)}.
In the following theorem, we characterize the optimistic equilibria. Let qMk be
the monopoly quantity in scenario k, k = 1, 2.
Theorem 5.4. For the two-scenario Cournot game G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, the
following holds:
a) If Πi1(qM1 , 0) > Π
i
2(qM2 , 0),
(c∗1, c
∗
1) ∈ Eop(G) if and only if st ≤ c∗1 ≤ st+1 with an even t.
(c∗2, c
∗
2) ∈ Eop(G) if and only if st ≤ c∗2 ≤ st+1 with an odd t.
b) If Πi1(qM1 , 0) < Π
i
2(qM2 , 0),
(c∗1, c
∗
1) ∈ Eop(G) if and only if st ≤ c∗1 ≤ st+1 with an odd t.
(c∗2, c
∗
2) ∈ Eop(G) if and only if st ≤ c∗2 ≤ st+1 with an even t.
As an illustration, consider the two-scenario Cournot game in which the inverse
demand functions in the scenarios are, respectively, p = 20 − 20q2 and p = 3 − q.
The conservative equilibria and the optimistic equilibria are obtained by applying
Theorem 5.1 b) and Theorem 5.4 a). The situation is represented in Figure 4.
5.3 Neutral equilibria
In order to model a duopoly in which both firms are neutral, the value functions of
the firms is represented by the average profit. That is, for i = 1, 2, ui ≡ n, with
n(x1, x2) = 1/2(x1 + x2),
A pair of strategies of the firms is a neutral equilibrium for the two-scenario
Cournot game, G, if it is an equilibrium when the attitude towards uncertainty of
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q2
R2c
R1c
q1
q2
s1
s1
c⇤1
R2op
c⇤1 c⇤2
c⇤2
R1op
Figure 4: Conservative equilibria (left) and optimistic equilibria (right)
both firms is represented by the function n. The set of neutral equilibria of game G
is denoted as En(G). Accordingly, in a neutral equilibrium firms obtain quantities
such that no individual deviation produces an improvement in the average profit.
The following result is a consequence of our initial assumptions on the inverse
demand functions in the different scenarios, and Lemma 3.4.
Theorem 5.5. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, a
unique neutral equilibrium exists, (c∗n, c
∗
n). Moreover, c
∗
1 ≤ c∗n ≤ c∗2.
6 Hybrid equilibria
In this section we analyze the case where the firms show different attitudes to un-
certainty. In accordance to Definition 4.1, a hybrid equilibrium is an equilibrium
of the two-scenario Cournot game, G, when the attitude towards uncertainty of the
firms is represented by functions u1 and u2, with u1 6= u2. The corresponding set of
hybrid equilibria is then denoted Eu
1,u2(G).
6.1 Neutral vs conservative
When one of the firms is neutral an the other firm is conservative, both value func-
tions are concave in its own action. Therefore, the existence of this type of hybrid
equilibrium is guaranteed. In what follows, we prove that, under our assumptions,
the equilibrium is unique and a result which identifies the equilibrium is presented.
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q2
R1n
R2c
Q¯
q1
z⇤12
Figure 5: Equilibrium when Firm 1 is neutral and Firm 2 is conservative
Let Firm 1 be neutral and Firm 2 be conservative, then u1 ≡ n, and u2 ≡ c.
Denote by (z∗1k , z
∗2
k ), k = 1, 2, the point where the reaction function of firm 1, R
1
n,
and the reaction function of firm 2 at scenario k, r2k, coincide. Denote by (z¯
1, z¯2), the
intersection of the graph of the reaction function, R1n, and the line L. The following
theorem establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium and identifies it, depending
on the relative position of the points (z∗1k , z
∗2
k ), k = 1, 2, and the line L.
Theorem 6.1. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, where
Firm 1 is neutral and Firm 2 is conservative, an equilibrium always exist and is
unique. Moreover,
a) En,c(G) = (z∗11 , z
∗2
1 ) if and only if Q¯ ≤ z∗11 + z∗21 .
b) En,c(G) = (z∗12 , z
∗2
2 ) if and only if Q¯ ≥ z∗12 + z∗22 .
c) En,c(G) = (z¯1, z¯2)En,c(G) if and only if z∗11 + z
∗2
1 ≤ Q¯ ≤ z∗12 + z∗22 .
As an example, consider the inverse demand function p = 32− 50q for scenario
1, and p = 1 − q for scenario 2. By applying Theorem 6.1 b), the equilibrium is
determined. Figure 5 illustrates this situation.
6.2 Neutral vs optimistic
When one of the firms is neutral and the other is optimistic, the existence of equi-
libria is not guaranteed. However, under our assumptions, if an equilibrium exists,
it is unique.
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Let Firm 1 be neutral and Firm 2 be optimistic, then u1 ≡ n, and u2 ≡ op.
Recall that for k = 1, 2, (z∗1k , z
∗2
k ) denotes the point where the reaction function
of firm 1, R1n, and the reaction function of firm 2 at scenario k, r
2
k, coincide. The
following result, which follows from Lemma 3.2, states that if an equilibrium exists,
it must be either (z∗11 , z
∗2
1 ) or (z
∗1
2 , z
∗2
2 ).
Lemma 6.2. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, where
Firm 1 is neutral and Firm 2 is optimistic, at most one equilibrium exists. Moreover,
En,op(G) ⊂ {(z∗11 , z∗21 ), (z∗12 , z∗22 )}.
The following result states the conditions for the existence of a hybrid equilibrium
for neutral and optimistic firms, and provides a procedure to identify it. The proof
follows analogous reasonings to those of Theorem 5.4 and 6.1.
Theorem 6.3. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, where
Firm 1 is neutral and Firm 2 is optimistic,
a) (z∗11 , z
∗2
1 ) ∈ En,op(G) if and only if either a1) or a2) holds
a1) Π21(0, qM1) < Π
2
2(0, qM2), and st ≤ z∗11 ≤ st+1 with an odd t.
a2) Π21(0, qM1) > Π
2
2(0, qM2), and st ≤ z∗11 ≤ st+1 for an even t.
b) (z∗12 , z
∗2
2 ) ∈ En,op(G) if and only if either b1) or b2) holds
b1) Π21(0, qM1) < Π
2
2(0, qM2), and st ≤ z∗12 ≤ st+1 with an even t.
b2) Π21(0, qM1) > Π
2
2(0, qM2), and st ≤ z∗12 ≤ st+1 for an odd t.
Note that in this hybrid situation, the existence of equilibria cannot be guaran-
teed. For instance, when the inverse demand functions are p = 10−q and p = 5− 7
20
q,
no equilibrium exists, as shown in Figure 6 (left-hand side).
Remark: For the case of linear models, when Π21(0, qM1) < Π
2
2(0, qM2), an equilib-
rium always exists, and is given by {(2c∗n − c∗2, 2c∗2 − c∗n)}. This follows from the
fact that, under this condition, the optimistic value function is not discontinuous.
This case is illustrated in Figure 6 (right-hand side) for inverse demand functions
p = 3− 5
2
q, and p = 2− q.
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Figure 6: Cases of no equilibrium (left) and equilibrium (right) when Firm 1 is
neutral and Firm 2 is optimistic
6.3 Conservative vs optimistic
When firms exhibit extreme and opposed uncertainty attitudes, that is, when one
of them is conservative and the other is optimistic, the existence of equilibria is not
assured either. In what follows we establish conditions for the existence of equilibria
in this hybrid situation.
Let Firm 1 be conservative and Firm 2 be optimistic, then u1 ≡ c, and u2 ≡ op.
Denote by (d∗1, d
∗
2) the point where the graph of the reaction function of firm 1
at scenario 1, r11, and the graph of the reaction function of firm 2 at scenario 2, r
2
2,
intersect. This point can be seen as the Cournot equilibrium in a situation where
the demand function of firm 1 corresponds to that of scenario 1, and the demand
function of firm 2 corresponds to that of scenario 2. Since the inverse demand
functions of the firms are identical at each scenario, it follows that (d∗2, d
∗
1) is the
intersection point of the graph of the reaction function of firm 1 at scenario 2, r12, and
the reaction function of firm 2 at scenario 1, r21 (note that d
∗
1 or d
∗
2 might be null).
In addition, we have to consider the points of discontinuity of the reaction function
of the optimistic firm. We denote these points as (st, R
2
op(st)), t = 0, 1, . . . t¯. The
following lemma states that if equilibria exist, then they must coincide with some
of these points.
Lemma 6.4. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, if Firm
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1 is conservative and Firm 2 is optimistic, then
Ec,op(G) ⊂ {(d∗1, d∗2), (d∗2, d∗1), (st, R2op(st)), t = 0, 1, . . . t¯}.
In the following result these hybrid equilibria are identified in the different cases.
Theorem 6.5. For the two-scenario Cournot game, G = {(Ai,Πi1,Πi2)i=1,2}, where
Firm 1 is conservative and Firm 2 is optimistic.
a) (st, R
2
op(st)) ∈ Ec,op(G) if and only if Q¯ = st + R2op(st).
b) (d∗1, d
∗
2) ∈ Ec,op(G) if and only if either b1) or b2) holds:
b1) Q¯ ≤ d∗1 + d∗2, Π21(0, qM1) < Π22(0, qM2), and st ≤ d∗1 ≤ st+1 for an even t,
b2) Q¯ ≤ d∗1 + d∗2, Π21(0, qM1) > Π22(0, qM2), and st ≤ d∗1 ≤ st+1 for an odd t.
c) (d∗2, d
∗
1) ∈ Ec,op(G) if and only if either c1) or c2) holds:
c1) Q¯ ≥ d∗1 + d∗2, Π21(0, qM1) < Π22(0, qM2), and st ≤ d∗2 ≤ st+1 for an odd t,
c2) Q¯ ≥ d∗1 + d∗2, Π21(0, qM1) > Π22(0, qM2), and st ≤ d∗2 ≤ st+1 for an even t.
Remark: Note that in the case in which d∗1 + d
∗
2 = Q¯, it may happen that (d
∗
1, d
∗
2)
or (d∗2, d
∗
1) are equilibria. In these cases d
∗
1 or d
∗
2 coincide with the discontinuities of
the reaction function R2op.
The existence of equilibria cannot be guaranteed in this case either. Consider
the following inverse demand functions: p = 60 − 30q and p = 20 − 6q. It can be
proven that there is no equilibrium. This case corresponds to the left-hand side of
Figure 7.
Remark: For linear models it can be shown that the existence of an equilibrium
can be guaranteed when Π21(0, qM1) < Π
2
2(0, qM2). The equilibrium is then (2c
∗
1 −
c∗2, 2c
∗
2 − c∗1). This case is illustrated in the right-hand side of Figure 7, where the
demand functions in the scenarios p = 3− 5
2
q, and p = 2− q.
Moreover, under the initial assumptions, for linear models, the condition in Case
a) of Theorem 6.5 does never hold, since the equilibria cannot belong to L.
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Figure 7: Cases of no equilibrium (left) and equilibrium (right) when Firm 1 is
conservative and Firm 2 is optimistic.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed the strategic decisions of firms in a context where
there are two possible scenarios characterized by different demand functions. The
firms have to decide their strategies on quantities before the uncertainty is resolved.
In an important preliminary step, the reaction functions of firms that exhibit
extreme and neutral attitudes to uncertainty have been fully described. We have
shown that under not very restrictive assumptions, the reaction for conservative
firms is a continuous piece-wise function with, at most, three pieces. In the case of
optimistic firms, the reaction function is also piece-wise. However, continuity cannot
be assured.
The analysis of equilibria is carried out when firms show identical and different
attitudes to uncertainty. In both cases, the presence of an optimistic firm implies
that the existence of equilibria cannot be guaranteed. However, we establish neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria and provide procedures
to determine the sets of equilibria. If both firms are neutral, or one of them is
neutral and the other one is conservative, equilibrium always exists and is unique.
When both firms are conservative, existence is also assured, but multiple equilib-
ria may exist. An important property of these equilibria is that, regardless of the
scenario that finally occurs, all of them yield the same total output and price level.
One interesting interpretation of these results is that, although crossing the price
threshold by changing quantity causes a radical shift in the scenario in which the
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firms compete, when both firms are conservative there is a certain stabilization of
equilibria; this does not occur when both firms are optimistic.
It is also worth remarking that, even though, when both firms are conservative
and hence, firms are symmetric, non-symmetric conservative equilibria do exist. In
fact, only one of the equilibria is symmetric. The consequence of the symmetry of the
model is that the set of conservative equilibria is a symmetric set. This generalizes
the result obtained by Caraballo et al. (2015) for linear models. Moreover, in linear
models, when both firms are optimistic, equilibria always exist, while this cannot
be assured for the general model.
Our analysis is valid for a broad range of concave inverse demand functions,
which include among others, the special cases of linear and quadratic functions.
However, our results have some limitations. For simplicity, and in order to avoid
excessive technicalities, we have restricted our analysis to the case of two scenarios.
Nevertheless, the ideas underlying our approach can also be used to describe the
conservative, the optimistic and the neutral reaction functions in the cases of more
than two scenarios, and therefore the corresponding equilibria could be identified.
On the other hand, the analysis could be extended to more realistic situations in
which firms do not exhibit extreme pessimistic or optimistic attitudes, and it is
possible to characterize their behavior in terms of a parameter representing their
degree of optimism. The influence of this optimism parameter on the equilibria
outcomes is the topic of current research.
In addition, the research carried out in this paper extends the range of real-world
situations where the ideas of Cournot competition can be applied. In fact, the study
of situations where the attitudes of the firms towards uncertainty are not symmetric
is particularly relevant since certain events can not only generate uncertainty about
demand, but also lead firms to adopt different attitudes towards uncertainty. This
would be the case, for example, of the results of parliamentary elections that can
give rise to uncertainty about the demand for goods and services. In addition, the
place where firms are located may influence their attitude towards uncertainty. If
the elections are held in a country of the European Union, the attitudes towards
uncertainty could depend on whether firms are settled inside or outside the Union.
Or let us think about the uncertain effects of the presidency of Donald Trump.
The attitude towards the uncertainty of a Mexican firm may not be the same as
that of an American firm.
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8 Appendix
Proof Lemma 3.1: Denote L = {(q1, q2) ∈ IR2 | q1 +q2 < Q¯}, and L¯ = {(q1, q2) ∈
IR2 | q1 + q2 > Q¯}. Recall that for each firm, the profit functions in the scenarios,
Π1 and Π2, are concave at its own action. When firm j selects a strategy q
j such
that Q¯ − qj ≤ ri1(qj) ≤ ri2(qj), then (ri1(qj), qj) ∈ L¯ and (ri2(qj), qj) ∈ L¯. Since,
at L¯ the value function coincides with the profits in scenario 1, Πc = Π1, then the
conservative firm i will select ri1(q
j) as the best response.
Analogously, if firm j selects a strategy qj such that ri1(q
j) ≤ ri2(qj) ≤ Q¯ − qj,
then (ri1(q
j), qj) ∈ L, and (ri2(qj), qj) ∈ L. Since, at L the value function of the firm
coincides with the profit in scenario 2, Πc = Π2, then the conservative firm i will
select ri2(q
j) as the best response.
If firm j selects a strategy qj such that ri1(q
j) ≤ Q¯−qj ≤ ri2(qj), then (ri1(qj), qj) ∈
L and (ri2(q
j), qj) ∈ L¯. Note that at L, Πc = Π2. If firm i chooses a strategy qi such
that (qi, qj) ∈ L, then the firm should select this quantity as large as possible since
Πc increases with q
i. However, once (qi, qj) ∈ L¯, then Πc = Π1, and Πc decreases as
qi increases. As a result, the best response for a conservative firm i is to choose the
strategy such that (qi, qj) ∈ L, that is qi = Q¯− qj. 2
Proof Lemma 3.2: By using a reasoning analogous to that of the Lemma 3.1 , it
is easy to see that, given a strategy of firm j, qj, if both (ri1(q
j), qj) and (ri2(q
j), qj)
belong to either L or L¯, then firm i will select the best response at the scenario
which corresponds to the optimistic option in L or L¯. 2
Proof Lemma 3.4: Consider qj ∈ Aj and qi = Rin(qj), j = 1, 2, j 6= i. Suppose that
qi = Rin(q
j) < ri1(q
j) < ri2(q
j). Since the profit functions at the scenarios Πi1 and Π
i
2
are stricly concave in its own actions and they attains their maximun value at ri1(q
j)
and ri2(q
j), respectively, then Πi1(q
i+ε, qj) > Πi1(q
i, qj) and Πi2(q
i+ε, qj) > Πi2(q
i, qj),
for ε > 0. Therefore, Πin(q
i + ε, qj) > Πin(q
i, qj) and qi is not the best response
to qj. Analogously, suppose that ri1(q
j) < ri2(q
j) < qi = Rin(q
j). In this case,
Πi1(q
i − ε, qj) > Πi1(qi, qj) and Πi2(qi − ε, qj) > Πi2(qi, qj), for ε > 0. Therefore,
Πin(q
i−ε, qj) > Πin(qi, qj) and qi is not the best response to qj. Hence, if qi = Rin(qj),
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then ri1(q
j) ≤ Rin(qj) ≤ ri2(qj). 2
Proof Lemma 4.2: In order to prove that Eu(G) ⊆ T , suppose on the contrary
that (q¯1, q¯2) 6∈ T and (q¯1, q¯2) ∈ Eu(G). If q¯1 < r11(q¯2), since each firm’s objective
function, Πik, is strictly concave in the firm’s own quantity, both Π
1
1(q
1, q¯2) and
Π12(q
1, q¯2) are increasing for q1 ≤ r11(q¯2), therefore, it follows that if firm 1 moves to
q¯1+ε then his profit will increase in both scenarios and thus Πu1 will increase. Hence,
(q¯1, q¯2) 6∈ Eu(G). Analogously, this can be proven for q¯1 > r12(q¯2), for q¯2 < r21(q¯1)
and for q¯2 > r22(q¯
1). 2
Proof Theorem 5.1: We first prove that T ∩ L ⊆ Ec(G).
A point (q1, q2) ∈ Ec(G), if and only if (q1, R2c(q1)) = (R1c(q2), q2). If (q1, q2) ∈
T∩L, then it follows from Lemma 3.1 that R1c(q2) = Q¯−q2 and R2c(q1) = Q¯−q1, and
therefore, since (q1, Q¯− q1) = (Q¯− q2, q2), the point is a conservative equilibrium.
We next prove that if (q1, q2) ∈ Ec(G) then either (q1, q2) ∈ T ∩ L or (q1, q2)
coincides with the Cournot equilibrium in one of the scenarios.
Suppose that (q1, q2) ∈ Ec(G) and (q1, q2) ∈ T ∩ L. Consider first the points
in the interior of T , int(T ). Let (q1, q2) ∈ int(T ) ∩ L. Since L is an open set
and q2 < r12(q
1), for ε > 0, then (q1, q2 + ε) ∈ int(T ) ∩ L. At L, Πc(q1, q2) =
Π2(q
1, q2), and it follows from the strict concavity in its own action of Π2 that
Πc(q
1, q2 + ε) > Πc(q
1, q2). Therefore, (q1, q2) 6∈ Ec(G). An analogous reasoning
holds when (q1, q2) ∈ int(T ) ∩ L¯.
Now consider the points on the boundary of T , ∂T . Note that these points are
located on the graphs of some of the reaction functions. Let (q1, q2) ∈ ∂T ∩L. At L,
Πc(q
1, q2) = Π2(q
1, q2), Therefore, for (q1, q2) to be a conservative equilibrium (q1, q2)
needs to be the Cournot equilibrium in scenario 2. Analogously, when (q1, q2) ∈
∂T ∩ L¯, if (q1, q2) is a conservative equilibrium, then this point must be the Cournot
equilibrium in scenario 1.
Cases a) and c): If Q¯ < 2c∗1 then (c
∗
1, c
∗
1) ∈ L¯. Since for (q1, q2) ∈ L¯, Πc(q1, q2) =
Π1(q
1, q2), it is easy to see that the Cournot equilibrium of scenario 1 is also a
conservative equilibrium. If Q¯ = 2c∗1, then T ∩ L = {(c∗1, c∗1)} and it follows that
Ec(G) = {(c∗1, c∗1)}. The proof of case c) is analogous.
Case b) If 2c∗1 < Q¯ < 2c
∗
2 then T∩L 6= {∅}, and T∩L ⊆ Ec(G). Moreover, (c∗1, c∗1)
cannot be a conservative equilibrium, since in this case (c∗1, c
∗
1) ∈ L, Πc(c∗1, c∗1) =
Π2(c
∗
1, c
∗
1), and therefore the firms can improve their conservative value function
by adopting a strategy qi > c∗1. Analogously, (c
∗
2, c
∗
2) cannot be a conservative
equilibrium, and the result follows. 2
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Proof Theorem 5.4: The result follows from Lemmas 3.3 and 5.2.
Proof Theorem 6.1: The existence of equilibria follows from the fact that the
value functions of the neutral firm and the value function of the conservative firm
are concave in its own action.
If Q¯ ≥ z∗12 + z∗22 then, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that R2c(z∗12 ) = r22(z∗12 ) = z∗22 .
Thus, (z∗12 , z
∗2
2 ) is an equilibrium. Conversely, if (z
∗1
2 , z
∗2
2 ) is an equilibrium, then
R2c(z
∗1
2 ) = r
2
2(z
∗1
2 ) and, from Lemma 3.1, Q¯ ≥ z∗12 + z∗22 holds.
To prove uniqueness, note that the reaction function of the neutral firm is strictly
decreasing and continuously differentiable and its derivative fulfills (R1n)
′(q2) > −1 in
the interval where it attains positive values. On the other hand, the reaction function
of the conservative firm is a piecewise function, strictly decreasing and continuous.
It is also differentiable, except at most at two points. Where differentiable, it fulfills
(R1c)
′(q1) ≥ −1.
Let Z¯2 = z
∗1
2 + z
∗2
2 . Since (R
1
n)
′(q2) > −1, for all the points of the graph
(R1n(q
2), q2) with q2 < z∗22 , then R
1
n(q
2)+q2 < Z¯2 holds. If the graphs of the reaction
functions, R1n and R
2
c , intersect at any other point (q
1, q2), then q2 = R2c(q
1) = Q¯−q1
or q2 = R2c(q
1) = r21(q
1) must hold. In both cases, by using Lemma 3.1, q1 + q2 ≥
Q¯ ≥ Z¯2 what contradicts R1n(q2) + q2 < Z¯2.
Cases b) and c) can be proven by using analogous reasonings. 2
Proof Lemma 6.4: If an equilibrium exists in L¯, then the reaction functions of
both firms must intersect on L¯. From Lemma 3.1, it can be assured that in L¯, the
conservative reaction function corresponds to r11. From Lemma 3.2, the optimistic
reaction function corresponds to r22. Therefore, only (d
∗
1, d
∗
2) can be an equilibrium.
The same reasoning applies if a equilibrium exists in L. In this case, only (d∗2, d
∗
1) can
be an equilibrium. If an equilibrium exists in L, Lemma 3.1 assures that the reaction
function of the conservative firm is defined by Q¯− q2. The optimistic response may
correspond to r21 or r
2
2, and therefore only if Q¯− q2 = st, where st corresponds to a
discontinuity of R2op, an equilibrium in L can exist. 2.
Proof Theorem 6.5: It follows from Lemma 6.4 and a similar reasoning to Theo-
rem 6.1
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